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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL;  
KOREA RODERIQUEZ; KOCEYDA HOPKINS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-15405) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, MATEY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges  
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Pro se appellant Jameel Ibrahim filed a complaint against the Attorney General of 
New Jersey and several other defendants in a separate case in the District Court in March 
2018, objecting to proceedings in a child support case.  He alleges the hearing officer at 
an April 2000 hearing acted without jurisdiction and improperly coerced him to agree to 
paternity testing.  The District Court eventually ruled that Ibrahim failed to state a claim 
in that complaint but gave him an opportunity to amend the complaint.  In July 2019, 
Ibrahim filed three similar documents in that case as part of his effort to amend.1  He then 
filed, in forma pauperis, a nearly identical document as the complaint in this case, naming 
the Attorney General as the sole defendant.  ECF No. 1.2   
In February 2020, Ibrahim filed an amended complaint, which was identical to the 
original, except that it named, in the caption, Koceyda Hopkins and Korea Rodriguez as 
additional defendants.  ECF No. 8.  Before Hopkins and Rodriguez were served, the 
Attorney General moved to dismiss the complaint and the District Court granted the 
motion.  The District Court also dismissed the claims against the unserved defendants, 
ruling that Ibrahim failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, 
alternatively, that Ibrahim’s claims were precluded by the dismissal of his identical or 
 
1 Letters from Jameel Ibrahim, Ibrahim v. State of N.J. Att’y Gen., No. 18-cv-03461 
(D.N.J. July 1, 8, and 10, 2019), ECF No. 73-75.  Ibrahim appealed the District Court’s 
eventual dismissal of that case.  C.A. No. 21-1128. 
2 Ibrahim filed a civil cover sheet identifying the defendants as “New Jersey Attorney 
General, et al,” but the caption of the complaint and certificate of service list only the 
Attorney General.  ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2. 
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similar claims in his first case.  ECF No. 20 at 7 n.2, 21.3  Ibrahim moved for 
reconsideration and the District Court denied the motion.  Ibrahim appealed.4 
I. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5  Because Ibrahim’s timely appeal 
from the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for 
review,” we will review the District Court’s dismissal order as well as the order denying 
reconsideration.  See McAllister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992).  
We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.6  Newark Cab 
Ass’n. v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).  We review 
 
3 In February 2021, a month after Ibrahim filed his notice of appeal, an executed 
summons was filed in the District Court indicating that Hopkins was served in December 
2020, between the District Court’s dismissal of the case and denial of reconsideration.  
ECF No. 31. 
4 Ibrahim specified, in his notice of appeal, a non-existent order entered on January 10, 
2021, and used a form that identified a different appellate court.  However, we conclude 
that his notice of appeal is adequate to raise a challenge to the final judgment entered on 
January 4, 2021.  See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 751-52 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“The duty to construe appeal notices liberally is heightened in cases involving pro se 
appellants.”). 
5 Given the District Court’s rulings, the recent service of the complaint on one defendant 
does not affect the finality of the judgment.  The lack of service on another defendant 
also has no effect.  See United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976). 
6 As Ibrahim was proceeding in forma pauperis, the District Court had the authority to 
dismiss the claims against then-unserved defendants sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 n. 19 (3d Cir. 
2002) (stating that non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs are “clearly within the scope of § 
1915(e)(2)”).   
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“a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but we review the 
District Court's underlying legal determinations de novo and factual determinations for 
clear error.”  Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  “We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by the record.”  
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
II. 
On appeal, Ibrahim’s arguments are varied and wide-ranging,7 but his focus is on 
an April 26, 2000 hearing conducted by a Child Support Hearing Officer.  He claims that 
the officer acted without jurisdiction over him and improperly used the threat of default 
or incarceration to coerce him into agreeing to genetic testing.  His arguments also 
include (1) objections to any system of compelled child support; (2) contentions that the 
Title IV-D system, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b, which requires states to maintain child 
support enforcement programs in order to qualify for certain federal funds, see Blessing 
v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 332-34 (1997), is constitutionally infirm or must be fully 
voluntary; (3) claims that New Jersey’s statutory and administrative implementation of 
Title IV-D’s requirements is unconstitutional; and (4) arguments that the particular 
treatment of his case failed to adhere to New Jersey’s regulations or violated his due 
 
7 Our review is limited to those arguments properly made before the District Court.  See 
Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021) (arguments raised for the 




process rights.  Upon review, we conclude, as the District Court did, that Ibrahim failed 
to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible federal claim against any of the defendants. 
In support of his argument that the New Jersey courts lacked personal jurisdiction 
over him, Ibrahim cites his heritage and claims to be an “American National and non U.S. 
Citizen” based on his own declaration, suggesting that these allegations have 
jurisdictional relevance.  These arguments are frivolous.  See United States v. Benabe, 
654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a person claiming to be a “sovereign 
citizen” is “not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts,” and that “[t]hese theories should be 
rejected summarily, however they are presented”); cf. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 
872, 878 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing “sovereign citizen” and “Moorish national” claims). 
Next, Ibrahim contends that personal jurisdiction could not be established by 
compulsion and treats Title IV-D proceedings as matter of contract.  He relies on a 
meritless argument that Title IV-D is somehow less binding because Title 42 of the 
United States Code has not been enacted as positive law.  “Congress’s failure to enact a 
title into positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the 
underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable.”  Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 
(9th Cir. 1985).  When a title has not been enacted as positive law, the Statutes at Large 
provide the definitive legal text, rather than the United States Code.  U.S. Nat. Bank of 
Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993).  Ibrahim does not 
cite any discrepancies between these sources.  And, contrary to Ibrahim’s contentions, the 
fact that federal and state law permit voluntary acknowledgement of paternity plainly 
does not demonstrate that personal jurisdiction in child custody cases can only be 
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established through explicit consent.  Leaving aside these frivolous arguments, Ibrahim 
did not allege sufficient facts to support his conclusory claim that the New Jersey courts 
lacked personal jurisdiction.8 
Ibrahim contends that he is challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, but 
he either restates his jurisdictional objections or makes generalized appeals to due process 
without specific facts.  In support of his due process claim, Ibrahim cites various 
provisions of New Jersey statues and regulations and claims that they were not correctly 
followed in his case.  These arguments, which often misstate the applicable law,9 do not 
support a federal due process claim in this case. 
 
8 Ibrahim cites to one subclause of the then-applicable New Jersey statute governing 
personal jurisdiction over non-residents in child support cases but did not allege that he 
was not a New Jersey resident at the time of the case or address the six other potential 
bases for personal jurisdiction within that provision.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-30.68 
(1998) (current version at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-30.129). 
9 For instance, Ibrahim argues that he did not receive notice of the OCSS’ administrative 
complaint procedures, as required by N.J. Admin. Code § 10:110-4.2.  That section was 
adopted by a new rule in 2004, and so was not in place at the time of the April 2000 
hearing.  See 36 N.J. Reg. 1207(a) (Mar. 1, 2004).  He also cites to N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 10:110-5.3 and claims that it applies to his case.  But the “administrative enforcement” 
addressed in that provision “means the use of high volume automated data processing to 
search various State data bases,” not, as Ibrahim assumes, the use of Child Support 
Hearing Officers.  N.J. Admin. Code § 10:110-1A.1. 
Ibrahim also contends that the hearing officer at the April 2000 hearing violated 
New Jersey Court Rule 4:43-2(b).  That provision allows a court to enter a default 
judgment in certain circumstances on the motion of a party.  Ibrahim emphasizes that it 
does not apply to “Family Part matters recognized by Part V of these rules,” and suggests 
that default judgment is therefore unavailable in Family Part cases.  See N.J. Ct. R. 4:43-
2(b).  But this passage was only added to the rule in 2007.  See 2 N.J. Prac., Ct. R. Ann. 
R. 4:43-2 (West 2021).  And the present rules provide for default judgments in Family 
Part cases in a separate provision within Part V.  N.J. Ct. R. 5:5-10. 
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Ibrahim argues that the hearing officer wrongly threatened to recommend 
contempt and incarceration.  At the time of the April 2000 hearing, Rule 5:25-3 permitted 
a Child Support Hearing Officer to request that the court adjudicate a person in contempt.  
See 2 N.J. Prac., Ct. R. Ann. R. 5:25-3 (West 2021).  Ibrahim does not allege that 
contempt proceedings were initiated.  And, to the extent that Ibrahim is arguing that 
counsel should have been appointed for him, there is no automatic federal right to 
counsel at civil contempt proceedings for an indigent person subject to a child support 
order, even if that individual faces up to a year of incarceration.  See Turner v. Rogers, 
564 U.S. 431, 448 (2011).  Ibrahim also claims that the hearing officer exceeded her 
authority, but his arguments are not consistent with his factual allegations.  A Child 
Support Hearing Officer may not resolve contested paternity cases but may “recommend 
that the court order a party to participate in blood or genetic tests for the purpose of 
establishing paternity.”  N.J. Ct. R. 5:25-3.  Ibrahim has not alleged a due process (or any 
federal) claim against the defendants based on the hearing officer’s actions.10 
Finally, Ibrahim identifies no applicable legal basis for his claim that New Jersey 
violates federal privacy laws by soliciting the Social Security Number of a non-custodial 
parent from a custodial parent, or that the custodial parent violates the law by providing 
the Social Security Number. 
 
10 Ibrahim claims that either the hearing officer’s conduct or New Jersey’s 
implementation of Title IV-D violates federal separation of powers principles.  Even if 
Ibrahim alleged sufficient facts to support a separation of powers claim, it would concern 




 While Ibrahim may regret submitting to genetic paternity testing twenty-one years 
ago, he did not provide sufficient allegations to state plausible federal claims against the 
defendants based on alleged infirmities in Title IV-D, New Jersey’s implementation of 
that Title, or the specific proceedings in his case.  The District Court properly dismissed 
Ibrahim’s complaint for failure to state a claim.11  Ibrahim sought reconsideration merely 
because of his disagreement with the District Court's analysis; that disagreement did not 
provide a basis for reconsideration.  See Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying reconsideration. 
III. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.12 
 
11 Given this conclusion, we need not consider the District Court’s alternative basis of 
claim preclusion. 
12 Ibrahim submitted a supplemental reply brief and moved for leave to file it.  3d Cir. 
ECF No. 16.  We grant that motion and we have considered the filed brief. 
